Para garantizarle una navegación por nuestra web segura y de calidad, le informamos que utilizamos Cookies. Si está de acuerdo clique ACEPTAR. Puede bloquear o eliminar las cookies instaladas en su equipo mediante la configuración de las opciones del navegador. Para más información consulte nuestra Política de Cookies
Acepto
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas

Publicaciones

Homophily and influence
Polanski, A. y F. Vega-Redondo
Fuente: Journal of Economic Theory
Resumen

We study how learning and influence co-evolve in a social network by extending the classical model of DeGroot (1974) in two fundamental ways:

(a) opinions are multidimensional and the learning time-span is arbitrary;

(b) the effective social network is endogenously shaped by opinion-based homophily.

Our analysis starts by establishing the existence of an equilibrium where, following (a)-(b), the learning outcome and the social network are jointly determined. This is followed by its characterization in some simple contexts. Next, we show that, at equilibrium, the strength of the link between any two agents is always given by its “support” – roughly, the amount of third-party (indirect) influence impinging on both agents. This result leads to the key insight that distinct groups may fail to integrate if their (possibly many) cross-group links lack sufficient support. Building on this, we identify sets of conditions for which social fragmentation is robust (i.e. dynamically stable) or even the unique equilibrium.

Cómo citar este artículo

Polanski, A. y F. Vega-Redondo (2023). «Homophily and influence». Journal of Economic Theory 207 (enero): 105576.