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Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas

Publicaciones

Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets
WP-AD 2012-03
Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets
González, M. y Martínez, F.
Año de publicacion: 2012
Palabras clave: endogenous quality, two-sided markets, broadcasting duopoly, publicly-owned platform, advertising regulation.
Clasificación JEL: L11, L33, L82, M37
Resumen
We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms.